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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ERICK DELAROSA,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 45119 & 45120
Bonneville County Case Nos.
CR-2012-1005 & 2016-5591

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Delarosa failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of seven and one-half years, with two and one-half years fixed in
case 45120, upon his guilty plea to forgery, or by denying his Rule 35 motions for reduction of
his sentences in both case 45120 and case 45119?

Delarosa Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
In case 45119, Delarosa pled guilty to forgery and the district court imposed a unified
sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.73-75.) Delarosa
filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.80-81,
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84-85.) After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the balance of
Delarosa’s sentence and placed him on probation for four years. (R., pp.88-91.)
Three years later, Delarosa’s probation officer filed a report of probation violation
alleging Delarosa had violated his probation by consuming methamphetamine and Adderall and
committing a new crime: forgery. (R., pp.121-35.) Delarosa admitted to having violated his
probation in case 45119 and pled guilty to forgery in case 45120. (R., pp.175-78, 271-74.) The
district court revoked Delarosa’s probation and executed his sentence in case 45119 (R., pp.19092) and imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven and one-half years, with two and onehalf years fixed in case 45120 (R., pp.288-90). Delarosa filed Rule 35 motions for reduction of
his sentences in both cases, which the district court denied. (R., pp.186-87, 203-04, 278-79, 29899.) Delarosa filed a notice of appeal timely from the order denying his Rule 35 motion in case
45119. (R., pp.300-03.) He also filed a notice of appeal timely from both the judgment and the
order denying his Rule 35 motion in case 45120. (R., pp.205-08.)
Delarosa asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in case 45120 in light of his substance abuse issues, desire for treatment, and purported
acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) Delarosa has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
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McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for forgery is 14 years. I.C. § 18-3604. The district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven and one-half years, with two and one-half years fixed,
which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.288-90.) Delarosa’s sentence is also
appropriate in light of his ongoing criminal behavior and his failure to rehabilitate while in the
community.
Delarosa’s criminal record demonstrates his disregard for the law and the terms of
community supervision. Delarosa has accumulated four misdemeanor convictions and, with the
instant offenses, five felony convictions.

(PSI, pp.34-37.)

Delarosa’s felony convictions

include: theft by acquiring lost property, fraud – possess forgery device, possession of a
controlled substance, and two counts of forgery. (PSI, pp.35-37.) Delarosa has had multiple
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opportunities to rehabilitate in the community and on retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.5-6, 37.)
Additionally, incarceration has failed to deter Delarosa as he has been in prison two different
times, for a total of nine years. (PSI, p.37.) While in prison from 2000-2004, Delarosa received
multiple DOR’s for sexual acts, disobedience, physical contact, simple assault, possession of
contraband, ordinance violations, manipulation of staff, rule violations, failure to comply, and
false statement. (PSI, p.6.) While Delarosa does have substance abuse issues and showed
remorse for his actions, such do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense nor his demonstrated
inability or unwillingness to conform his behavior to the law.
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and addressed the seriousness of the offense, Delarosa’s ongoing criminal offending, the
risk he poses to society, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite prior treatment
opportunities and legal sanctions. (1/30/17 Tr., p.21, L.14 – p.23, L.13.) The state submits that
Delarosa has failed to establish that his sentence is excessive for reasons more fully set forth in
the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument
on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Next, “mindful of the fact that [he] had previously filed a Rule 35 motion in” case 45119,
Delarosa nevertheless asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his latest
Rule 35 motions for a reduction of his sentences in both case 45119 and case 45120 because he
“had been treatment-oriented and treatment-focused since being back in custody.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.6.) Delarosa’s arguments fail.
Delarosa has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule
35 motion in case 45119 because, as Delarosa all but concedes on appeal, the motion was
impermissibly successive and, as such, the district court was without jurisdiction to even
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consider it. See I.A.R. 35(b) (“no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction
of sentence under this Rule”); State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002) (“the
prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit”).
Delarosa has also failed to show any abuse of discretion in the denial of his Rule 35
motion in case 45120. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction
of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To
prevail on appeal, Delarosa must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion.” Id. Delarosa has failed to satisfy his burden.
Information with respect to Delarosa’s desire for treatment was before the district court at
the time of sentencing and, as such, was not new information that entitled Delarosa to a reduction
of sentence. (PSI, pp.43, 70.) Furthermore, the availability of treatment options does not
demonstrate that Delarosa’s sentence is excessive. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho
497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993) (“While the appellant points to the evidence in the record that
he is capable of being rehabilitated … his possibility of rehabilitation, standing alone, is not
enough to meet his burden of showing unreasonableness…”); State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292,
294, 805 P.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 1991) (“Sentence of confinement is not rendered unreasonable
simply because it will arguably have a negative effect on prisoner's rehabilitation.”).
The district court considered all of the relevant information and appropriately concluded
that Delarosa’s sentence of two and one-half years fixed “is appropriate” and even “modest in
some sense.” (Tr., p.33, Ls.16-17.) Delarosa has not shown that he was entitled to a reduction
of sentence simply because of his desire for treatment. Given any reasonable view of the facts,

5

Delarosa has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motions for a reduction of his sentences.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Delarosa’s conviction and sentence in
case 45120 and the district court’s order denying Delarosa’s Rule 35 motions for a reduction of
his sentences in both cases.

DATED this 13th day of February, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

'!'HE DEflNDAl/f: No.

THE COORr: Ard -'lllE OEF!NDANr: Sorry just to waste all yoo

guys' tine.
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'lliE COORr: Okay. '!hank You for yoor

staterent.
Ard then are you fully satisfied with
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a Mt. Grant' s representation?
THE DEF!NOANI': Yes.
THE COJRJ': Ard, Counsel , any legal reason why
ll the Court shouldn' t proceed?
MR. GAANf: No, sir.
13
THE COOR!': Okay.
14
Well, I awreciate the new infomation as it
9
10

KeyBank.
I -- I know we went through that change of plea
11 on the washer and dryer. It was a felony offense. No one
18 disputes that. I certainly d:>ll' t. I accepted it.
19
But as I went th.rC1Jgh the presentence report,
20 was, yoo knoll, woroerin;J what an ai:propriate sentence would be
~I on a eose like this.
I hear the State' s reccmrendation and think,
22
~J Ch, lW'/ goodness; 3 years fixed dill 10 years indetemi.nate.
21 It's justified in tMny respects because this is repeat felony.
cS
ml YC1J -- dill -- and if I accept what they
IS relates to the
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this Court sees.
It -- it is a prison c.ise. By itself, ma~
the washer and dryer alone would be a prison case gh-en yoor
prior criminal histocy. &It I'm -- you knoll, I'm oot prepared
to necessarily sen1 yoo to prison for 13 years.
But the -- as I said, it ookes sense to Ill:! ilhy
the State would recarrrend that .ilen they consider yoo've had a
history of being in prison, and here we are again.
So r •mgoing to try to cb sarething in between
the recanrendations of the party. I don't think a retained
jurisdiction is ai:prqiriate ror camunity placarent.
There is a protection of society issue there
that I tlli.nk, requires soie prison,
Ho,., roch tine, Mr. Delarosa, have you served on
this eose, do )I'.),) believe?
l'R. Gll}.111': We' re just aboot, I th.ink, eight
tll)f)ths, your HOnor.
TilE O'.:IJRI': Okay. AM then, as the State
highlighted, we are dealing with a probat ion violation,
In that c.ise, YCIJ' ve got a 3 years fixed,
correct? Do you know oo,, 1ruch tD!e -THE l"EralOANI': That one ends ~tch 20th of
th.is year .
THE COOR!': Of this ye.it'?
MR. GRANI': I -- I think that' s the
23
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have stated, as you spending so rruch of your life in prison,
~ do -- ~ <b I -- IX1J do I sentence you, and all over a
washer and dryer?
Ard, yet, nC!J I -- I see that there ' s 111'.lre
infor:IMtion. And there is one or M stateuents in the ixilice
rep:irt relatin;J to the washer and dryer, but I certainly
didn't have the full picture that there were other tl,ings
going on.
There are objectives thilt the State have
identified for the Court. They incl!Xle punishnent , protection
of society, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
Ard, you kncrw, you -- you put the Court in the
difficult position of sentencing you in a way that satisfies
those cbjectives but while also trying to put the rontext of
this offense in -- yoo -- you've got a problen with taking
other people's property. There' s no question aoout that.
Yoo have a history of that with theft and
forgery and -- and then this case. 'lllat' s not all of your
prior offenses.
YCll knoll, I'm discouraged about rehabilitation
and -- and deterrence, as we have this ongoing pattern of
criminal violations.
And yet I' 11 try to give you credit for yoor
plea of -- of guilty and your o,mership to that and (Xltting in
the context this to those factors an:! a 11 the other eases tl\l.t

1

probation.
TllE DEf'rnllAtll': 'The probation.

THE COOR'!': ttn-mm.

MR. GAAN!": But as for tile urd:rlying sentellO:!,
your Honor, trere was a -- a -- a retained ju.r:isdiction that
1
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was served. There have been sare previous incarceration there
plus this 8 oonths .
He's got to be at aoout a year am a half on
that, probably, of the fixed sentence,
THE COOR'!': Okay.
MR. GAANr: ~ybe a little over. Maybe 20
nnnth.s.
THE CXXJRl': Okay. So the Court will provide
the folla.,ing senteoce:
on the forgery = t that you've pied guilty
to, 2 1/2 years fixed foll()l,le(! by S years irrleterminate, for a
unified sentence of 7.5 years. That's in between where the
parties are suggest ing the Coort go.
And I think I'm doing my best to satisfy the
objectives of ,:-riminal punis~nt by the 2 1/2, rerognizing
you' ve got S(Xl"f! ture to serve on the probation case and you've
also aectalltlated sare ti.ire.
Aoo then an indeterminate period, that is
exceeding the -- what~ typic.!lly see. But there is a pretty
significant iooetenninate tilte on the other mtter. So it's a
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